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After listening to what Daniela Vargas said about Brazil, I would say,
to be very brief, that it is the same in Mexico. But I prefer to say more by

telling you what our history is in civil procedure, the dispute resolution
system, and the judicial system in Mexico.
First of all, our commerce code was enacted in 1889, so not just in the

last century, but the nineteenth century. It followed the Spanish model. In
1996, more than seven years ago, there was a movement for deregulation
in all administrative issues; supporters of the movement felt that the

judicial rules were over-regulated. They tried to deregulate, to simplify the
commercial procedure and the civil procedure because they said it was a
kind of obstacle to the economy. Mexico is not ruled by lawyers as it was
in the past; first it was ruled by generals, then by lawyers, now by
economists. The economists think about judicial reform and judicial
changes because they are something that affects the economy. All types of
commercial transactions are, at some point, going to court to resolve
disputes. When the business people noticed that disputes were not quickly

and fairly solved, they said, "We don't want to do business in Mexico. We
don't want to invest in Mexico. We don't want to have anything to do with

Mexico." That is the idea held by foreign investors, and also by local
investors, who prefer to send their money to some other jurisdiction where
they have a better judicial system. I do not know where, but they say that
there are better judicial systems.
What are the contents of the amendments of 1996? Mainly, what
Daniela Vargas said about Brazil; defenses that stayed procedures were
eliminated. Also, all the objections to jurisdiction, all the motions to
change jurisdiction, were motions that stayed procedures as well because

the law said, "First, we have to determine what the proper jurisdiction is,
and then we may continue the case." But the litigators said, "No, no, lack
ofjurisdiction" simply because it stayed the case.

Inflation was a problem that we faced in the 1980s, when we had
inflation rates over a hundred percent per year. Interest rates paid by the
banks were 120% per year while the interest rate in court was 6%, so it
made the best business sense to be sued with legal interest rates and have
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your money in a bank. After the case was resolved three years later, you
would have, just with interest, enough money to pay the creditor, to pay
the attorney, and to have twice the money you owed.
In Mexico we also have a lot of objections about the power of attorney.
I see the lawsuits in the United States where the attorney signs on behalf
of the plaintiff without a power of attorney. How do we know the lawyer
is representing the plaintiff just because he says so? In Mexico you need
a sweeping power of attorney, including all of the background of the
company, the date of incorporation, the proof of incorporation, the name

of the shareholders, the name of the board, the changes of the board, the
powers of the board, and finally the granting of the power of attorney
before a notary public. If it is a foreign power of attorney, you have to look

at the Washington protocol and other agreements, and this often leads to
fighting because of the representation in court.
In the 1996 amendments this was changed. If lack of power of attorney
can be cured, the plaintiff has ten days to cure the problem. Then the
litigation is about how to cure it. I have had a lot of problems with it, but
in the end the problem does not supercede the case. You have the chance
to remedy it. Also, the appeals that stopped the procedure were deleted.
The only appeal that suspends the procedure is the appeal against the final
judgment. In the past, several appeals could stay the case, but today only
the final judgment appeal is the one that leads to stays.
Regarding the evidence period, the rule of article 14 of the Brazilian
Code is beautiful; Daniela Vargas says that it is not enforced. In Mexico
we do not even have that rule, but it is always understood that you do not
have to file unnecessary evidence and so forth. But in our system, the more
evidence you provide, the more time you consume and the longer the case
lasts. Litigators say, "Well, if you are not going to win, if you are going to
lose the case, lose it in five years, and it will be better." I remember a story
that a former chief justice of Mexico used to tell when he became district
judge thirty years ago. He said that his second week in the district court,
he saw a birthday cake. He said, "What are you doing with this birthday

cake? Who is the person with the birthday?" His staff replied, "No, no, no,
this is for a case. It is the tenth birthday of this case." They had a cake to

celebrate ten years of an amparo case.
We also have a problem of local justice against federal justice. In
Mexico all cases, without exception, can be resolved by the federal
judiciary. Our system is a federal republic. Following the American
constitution, we have a federal constitution with different states, and a
local judiciary as well as a federal judiciary. But our constitution provides
for something that is known as amparo and Americans often think, "What
is amparo? What is it like?" It is said that amparo was a Mexican invention
that was followed by some other Latin American countries. I do not know
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/6
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if it was really a Mexican invention or whether Mexicans were just the
first to use the word amparo. Amparo means "protect." We say that

amparo is like the eye of God. It appears everywhere and sometimes we
want it and sometimes we do not want it. What is it? Amparo is a
procedure that is established in the Mexican constitution to protect the bill
of rights. Illegal imprisonment, illegal arrest, illegal foreclosure,
everything that could be illegal from any authority is subject to amparo.
Within the bill of rights, one of the most important clauses is the exact
application of the law. No one can be deprived by an authority of his or her
assets, goods, or freedom without the exact application of the law through
due process of law. So we have the exact application of due process. All
judicial rulings can be challenged, arguing that any procedural breach
resulted in a lack of due process or that there is no exact application of the
law. What is the exact application of the law? That depends on every
litigator. That leads to a dispute. As it is a provision of the very bill of
rights, and the amparo exists to protect the bill of rights, any judgment that
deprives you of any property right, possession or the like can be
challenged through the amparo.
In the beginning, the constitution dictated that the amparo was
something to be heard by the district court and then by the Supreme Court
itself. You can imagine the trouble that could arise when, with millions of
people in Mexico, one could have litigation for small amounts and even
those cases went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court resolved every
case that litigators wanted to have resolved by them. In the 1940s or 1950s
there was an amendment to the constitution establishing that the circuit
courts could hear some cases instead of the Supreme Court. And finally in
the 1970s cases were divided on the basis of the amount in dispute.
Depending on the amount, the case could be heard by the Supreme Court
or by the circuit courts. In 1994 we had the last and most important
amendment to the judicial system in Mexico, after which the Supreme
Court only hears cases in matters of constitutionality, or cases that arise
under the attraction powers. Under the latter, the Supreme Court can
"attract" a given case that is important for its relevance, either socially
speaking or legally speaking. So today the Supreme Court has been
replaced by the circuit courts. We have hundreds of circuit courts and they
have final resolution of most cases. The problem is that the circuit courts
contradict one another because what is good for one circuit court is not
always good for all. The Supreme Court resolves these contradictions.
So, every case can be resolved by the federal judiciary, even if it is a
local case for application of a local law. It is the same in criminal cases, in
commercial cases, in tax cases, and in labor cases. There was a discussion
four or five years ago that the chief justices of all these states wanted to
stop the amparo for judicial cases. They said, "We want our autonomy. We
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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as local judiciary want our judgments to be the final and last ones without
any challenges being taken to the federal judiciary." Some lawyers
supported that idea. Are the states minors? Are they children? Can we
leave them to resolve their disputes without the federal judiciary handing
down the last judgment through the amparo? Some people were in favor
of that amendment, but of course if you are a litigator and you go to a
state, you cannot imagine how strong the localism is. I usually tell my
students, "Would you feel comfortable litigating against Ford Motor
Company in Detroit? Or against Boeing in Seattle? Or against Cerveceria
Cuauhtemoc in Monterrey?" If it is the main industry in a city or in a state,
how can we feel comfortable conducting litigation against that big
company in that small place? That is why we think that utilizing the
federal judiciary is correct.
There was a recent, scandalous case that reveals these troubles. An
insurance company in Mexico City had a problem in Baja California
where a hurricane damaged an insured plant and the insurance company
had not paid to the insured company.' The local governor said, "The
company is not working, is not paying salaries. It is not a source of income
taxes and so forth. So let's press the insurance company." Of course the
local prosecutor filed charges against the insurance company. The local
judge issued arrest orders against the seven directors of the company.2 The
company has Dutch investment. It was acquired by a Dutch company
recently and seven officers were criminally prosecuted in this small state.
What did they do? Some of them went to the amparo to obtain a kind of
habeas corpus and others came to the United States to have a unplanned
vacation while the case was solved by the federal judiciary.3 The federal
judiciary has been solving the cases in favor of these officers. They still
have problems today. But the local judiciary is very partial to the local
people. I do not trust local judiciaries and I prefer to have the federal one.
There is a new program that bankers are starting in the judicial system.
They want the commercial cases, mainly involving fines and securities and
so forth, to be heard by federal courts. They say that they want specialized
federal courts in commercial matters. It is something that in the United
States they do not understand easily, but commercial cases in Mexico are
federal and local. Our constitution says that the federal courts are to try
cases involving the application of international treaties or federal law. As

1. See ING Wants Charges Resolved in Fertinal Case, Bus. NEWS AM., Oct. 6, 2003.

2. The first case in this ongoing battle has led to two more; in all, 13 ING employees have
been charged. See id.
3. ING has since filed charges against the judges in the case, alleging an illegal asset
embargo. See ING Files CriminalChargesAgainst Judges in Fertinal Case, Bus. NEWS AM., Nov.

6, 2003.
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the commerce code is a federal statute, federal courts are open to hear
commercial cases. But the constitution says that when only private
interests are involved, the local courts may try these cases as well. So most
of the people go to the local courts and not to the federal courts. So today,

bankers want to have specialized courts in the federal judiciary for
commercial cases.
In the international field, we have a lot of problems with the

conventions.

We have conventions about jurisdiction. We have

conventions about enforcement ofjudgments. We have conventions about
taking of evidence abroad. Our main commercial partner is the United
States, and we are looking to conventions in many cases with international
aspects. We see the inter-American conventions on jurisdiction, the interAmerican conventions on enforcement, on taking of evidence abroad, and
so forth. Yet every time an American lawyer calls a Mexican lawyer about
these conventions, they say, "Let's go to the Hague convention for the
taking of evidence abroad." How about the enforcement convention? Well,
the United States promoted this inter-American convention very actively
and never, never ratified it. Well, how about the inter-American
convention on the taking of evidence abroad? It is the same. How about
the convention on jurisdiction? The same. In many cases the Americans
complained about corruption in Latin America, but we Latin Americans
complain about the failure of the United States to sign many of the
international litigation conventions.
I remember some years ago at New York University, there was a
seminar about the proposed Hague Convention on jurisdiction and
enforcement ofjudgments. One American lawyer said that in Bolivia and
Ecuador, in one case, 70% and in the other 100% of the judgments were
obtained through corruption. I was really surprised. I said, "How can you
know? Is there an official statistic about it? I don't think the bribes are
paid before a notary or they give a receipt or they have witnesses. I really
don't know. How can they say 100% of judgments involved corruption?"
In my country many times we say, "There was corruption here." Why?
We as lawyers say, "What doesn't sound logical, sounds metallic." So, if
there is not a logical judgment, you think, there is something funny here.
It is not necessarily economic corruption; there is also corruption through
friendship and other such things. But I cannot believe that applies to all
cases. If it were so, then the law schools would be empty. Why do you
need lawyers if you obtain judgments through corruption? When a bad or
negligent lawyer loses a case, we have to tell the client we lost. Why not
say we lost because the judge is corrupt? It is a very good solution. I am
a very good lawyer but the judge received a bribe. It is, however, not true.
On the other hand, the Americans and the English in that seminar, were
saying, "How can we accept the enforcement of a foreign judgment if the
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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judgment was obtained through corruption? Well, let us give the American

judges the authority to analyze if the judgment was obtained through
corruption." Doing so is almost impossible. So it is a matter of trust. We
have to trust foreign systems; if we do not, we cannot continue in the
international community, because we have foreign judgments to be
enforced in Mexico and Mexican judgments to be enforced abroad. The
main problem is that in Mexico we can say, "How can I enforce a foreign
judgment against a Mexican in Mexico if it was rendered in English in an
American court with depositions, with cross-examination, with a lot of
institutions, with discovery, and with all these legal processes that are
unfamiliar in Mexico?" We can say, "How can we trust a judgment

rendered by somebody wearing a black robe?" for in Mexico we do not
have robes for judges except in ceremonies.
Finally, my conclusion is the same conclusion that is shared by some
other colleagues from Central and South America who say that we do not
need to change the law, we need to change the people. The problem with
law students - it is the same in Brazil as in Mexico - is that, once they
obtain their degree, they have to choose where to work. What these
students want immediately is to earn money. They want to serve justice,
of course, but if justice is served here or there, which field is one going to
choose? The one that provides better compensation. They do not want to
join the judiciary. In the local judiciary in Mexico City only one judge
comes from my school, only one judge. If you go, for instance, to the
board of the Mexican Bar Association with twenty members, eight of them
come from my school. The proportion is strange. The good students go,
first of all to the United States to get another degree and to be fully
bilingual, then to be hired by important law firms where they earn more
money than judges. To be a judge, you need at least five years of practice,
must pass an exam, have a record, and so on. If we think that lawyers who
are under thirty and have less than five years of experience cannot be
judges, then how do you explain our poor judiciary? The answer is very
simple. The young attorneys go to law firms, to big companies; they do not
go to the judiciary. They are bilingual and the judges are not bilingual.
They are well prepared and the judges are not.
In 1994 the Supreme Court had an amendment and they created the socalled Judicial Council. The Judicial Council is devoted to improving the
federal judiciary, the skill level of judges. They have an institute to train
judges and all other judicial officers, and they are improving. I think the
federal judiciary is improving, with better salaries, with better
compensation for judges; with more training and more preparation, they
are becoming more international today. That is something that surprised
me in the recent past. The federal Judicial Council is being copied by the
local judiciaries. I think that is a cause for hope.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/6
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I want to see the other side of the coin improve too. Not just to improve
the judiciary, but also the lawyers - the legal profession is not just the

bench, it is also the bar. Are the lawyers very good litigators? Well, we try
to be. But we try to be practical. We try to win cases. And there is no
disciplinary system in Mexico. Attorneys go unpunished. You can abuse
process every time if you want. You can create evidence. You can file
unnecessary evidence. If the judge does not take care of it and admits the
evidence, the case takes longer. What about abuse of process? What about
bar punishment or bar discipline against abusive lawyers? We have
nothing. In Mexico, we do not have a mandatory association. We have just
a license to practice law that is good forever. We do not have continuing
legal education. We do not have ethical supervision. We have nothing.
Now the Mexican bar association is trying to do something about it, and
we are expecting that, in the future, affiliation with the bar association will
become mandatory, and that then we will have disciplinary systems within
these associations. I think the solution is not near but we are moving
toward it. I think the process will take a long time, but if we have already
started it, we are on the right path.
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